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ABSTRACT 
The central problem of this paper is to decide the 
significance of formal argument for God's existence, in 
light of John Henry Newman's distinction between notional 
and real assent. If God in fact exists, then only real 
assent to the proposition asserting his existence is 
adequate. Notional assent is inadequate because it is 
assent to a notion or abstraction, and not to a present 
reality. But on Newman's view it is notional assent which 
normally follows on a formal inference, therefore the 
significance of traditional formal arguments is thrown 
into question. 
Newman has claimed that our attitude toward a 
proposition may be one of three; we may doubt it, infer 
it, or assent to it, and to assent to it is to hold it 
unconditionally. That unconditional assent may be of two 
kinds, notional or real. A notional assent is an assent to 
a proposition whose terms are apprehended as notions; a 
real assent is an assent to a proposition whose terms stand 
for things or for images, and Newman says alternately both. 
The former position, that in real assent the terms of a 
proposition stand for things, requires a strongly realistic 
theory of knowledge, which Newman seems to deny. 
ii 
Because 
the distinction cannot be tied to that between notions 
and things; because of epistemologicai constraints, nor 
to singular and general terms, because the relationship 
is indirect, images assume great importance. But Newman 
is concerned with assents to many propositions containing 
terms we cannot imagine in the ordinary sense, consequently 
"image" is understood broadly. 
One of those propositions is the proposition "God 
exists" and Newman offers an argument in its support, an 
argument from conscience, and he describes the character-
istics of a real assent to God's existence. It involves 
an image especially of the predicate term, which is 
personal because it arises out of the individual's 
experience, and practical because images affect our 
feelings, and we act when our feelings direct us. The 
argument divides conscience into sanction, or "commanding-
ness" and law, or what is commanded. It derives its force 
from the sanction of conscience; conscience could not have 
its authority over us, and we would not respond emotionally 
as we do, if God did not exist. 
Newman has overlooked traditional metaphysical 
proofs as a source of the same kind of real, imaginative, 
assent. Existential interpreters of Thomas Aquinas, and 
existentialists in general have described quite well the 
real apprehension of existence which makes possible real 
assent to the proposition "God exists", and at the same 
time lends force to the traditional argument from contingent 
existence. 
iii 
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in 1922 (published in English a~ A Newman Synthesis in 
1931 3 ) and Nedoncelle's La Philosophie Religieuse ~ John 
Henry Newman, published in 1946. 4 But while scathing 
philosophical analyses of Newman's work abounded before 
the second world war, and possibly because they were so 
numerous and inaccurate, they are now scarce. What has 
happened according to Weatherby, author of Cardinal 
Newman in His Age, is that Newman scholars represent him 
more accurately now, but because they are convinced of his 
religious orthodoxy and sympathetic to it (modernism is a 
heterodox position in the Roman Catholic Church) they have -
overlooked the difficulties that Newman's philos ·ophy 
presents. 5 
Those difficulties are a consequence of the very 
things for which Newman is admired: his coming to terms 
with the subjectivism, individualism, and relativism which 
characterize later nineteenth and twentieth century thought. 
Newman was willing to grant to the subjectivists that we 
know best what is interior to us, to individualists that 
things or persons or images and not universal propositions 
are the most powerful sources of religious knowledge, and 
to relativists that the apprehension of religious truth is 
a personal product that varies greatly from one to another. 
And yet he clearly meant to preserve these positions from 
consequences incompatible with Roman Catholic doctrine, for 
2 
instance the doctrine that the existence of God can be 
proven by natural reason. 
One of the areas in which Newman's thought runs 
counter to what he himself calls "the tradition of 1500 
years" is the relationship between faith and reason. More 
specifically, he contradicts a traditional view of the 
role that philosophical argument is to play in deciding 
religious questions. 
Newman claims first, that for most men who 
believe, say that God exists, their belief is not grounded 
in formal argument, but in a variety of indicators. He 
writes in the Development of Christian Doctrine 
that as for the reasons of believing, they are fo~ 
the most part implicit, and but slightly recognized 
by the mind that is under their influence, that they 
consist moreover rather of presumptions and guesses, 
ventures after the truth than of accurate proofs; and 
that probable arguments are _sufficient for conclusions 
which we ever embrace as most certain and turn to the 
most important uses.6 
What is radical in Newman is that he is willing to call the 
conclusion of that process a ''certainty" and that the 
conviction which accompanies it 11certitude 11 • 7 Most 
philosophers have restricted certainty to the conclusion 
of formal demonstrative proof. Newman has attempted to 
admit a variety of means of coming to know propositions, 
while still securing their truth. 
Second, Newman doubts that even with a formal 
demonstrative proof available, that men would come to what 
3 
he calls "real assent" or certitude. He writes in the 
Grammar of Assent 
This is why science has so little of a religious 
tendency; deductions have no power of persuasion. 
The heart is commonly reached, not through the 
reason, but through imagination ... to most men 
argument makes the point in hand only more doubtful, 
and considerably less impressive. After all man is 
not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, 
contemplating, acting animal ... Life is not long 
enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never 
have done beginning, if we determine to begin with 
proof.8 
Formal argument then for Newman is not a process by which 
men ordinarily come to real assent, and it is the nature of 
the relationship between philosophical argument for and 
real assent to God's existence which poses the ~entral 
problem of this paper. The paper has three parts: 
I) a drawing-out of the distinction between notional and 
real with criticisms; II) a discussion of Newman's argument 
from conscience for God's existence; and III) a parallel 
discussion of Aquinas~ argument from contingent existence. 
Newman offers in the Grammar of Assent his 
outstanding contribution to the philosophy of religion, 
and to the theory of knowledge as well, that is the 
distinction between real and notional assent. Briefly, 
real assent is an assent to a proposition whose terms stand 
for things. It is opposed to an assent to a proposition 
whose terms stand for notions or abstractions. What Newman 
attempts to give in the Grammar is an epistemological account 
of a familiar truth about our ordinary assents. "The 
4 
destruction of the world by nuclear weapons is imminent,'' 
is sometimes a notional proposition and sometimes a real 
proposition to a given individual, and his assent, if he 
assents, to it is correspondingly notional, or real. 
About the notional we say "I knew it, but I didn't really 
see it, or it didn't matter to me" and about the real assent 
"All of a sudden I realized it, or it struck me; it hit 
home." How this distinction can be drawn on an 
epistemological level is the topic of the first section of 
this paper. Although I think there are insurmountable 
difficulties in Newman's account of the distinction between 
notional and real assent, still real assent is the goal of 
any theistic proof. 
In the second section I look critically at the kind 
of approach to God's existence Newman himself thinks is most 
persuasive. Newman outlines a formal argument from 
conscience to God 1 s existence in the chapter "Proof of 
Theism" in his Philosophical Notebook. Why he does so, 
given his view of deductive argument, is discussed. 
There is an informal version of the same argument in the 
Grammar. An informal argument ordinarily does not 
supply the reader with enough information to ensure its 
conclusion, and Newman thinks no argument about concrete 
facts can. The conclusion of a formal argument must be 
true if its premises are true, so it seems a reader who 
was convinced of the truth of its premises, would be 
5 
equally sure of its conclusion. It is thoroughly 
characteristic Newman to prefer the first informal 
approach. 
In the third section I compare Aquinas' Third 
Way (Summa theologiae) to knowledge of the existence 
of God, to Newman's argument. Newman argues from the 
experience of conscience, Aquinas from contingent 
existence. (Something exists contingently if it is 
possible for it to exist or not exist.) I find Aquinas' 
argument more effective. Although it is difficult to give 
a full explanation on an epistemological level of real 
assent, formal argument does not preclude it. 
6 
I. NOTIONAL AND REAL APPREHENSION AND ASSENT 
This section critically explores the distinction 
Newman draws in the Grammar of Assent between notional 
and real assent to a given proposition. As will become 
clear, the difference between notional and real assent is 
largely a function of how we apprehend the terms--the 
subject and the predicate--of the proposition to which we 
give our assent. Whether or not we can differentiate 
between the two kinds of apprehension from within a modern, 
as Newman's is, theory of knowledge, is the central 
difficulty. But before asking that question, it is 
necessary to understand what Newman means by assent and 
apprehension, and the notional and real varieties of each. 
A. ASSENT 
Newman thinks of coming to know as a process 
beginning with a question--Does God exist?, progressing 
to a conclusion--My conscience is troubled; therefore 
God exists, and ending in an assertion--God exists. 
Each of those statements, the question, the conclusion, 
and the assertion, he calls propositions. Doubt, 
inference, and assent are the corresponding "modes of 
holding propositions," which Newman defines in this way: 
to doubt a proposition is to be unable to hold it; to 
7 
infer a proposition is to hold it on sufficient grounds, 
and to assent to a proposition is to hold it. 9 
Newman considers his categories exclusive. 
Propositions which are inferred, or held on sufficient 
grounds, are not a subset of propositions which are 
assented to, or simply held. To hold on sufficient 
grounds is for Newman a peculiar kind of holding; assent 
itself has a different character. In fact, establishing 
the ''substantiveness" of assent is central to the Gr~mmar. 
To support the intrinsic difference of assent from 
inference, Newman points out that even in cases where an 
argument disposes us to assent, assent can be withheld, or 
given and then withdrawn while the argument _is unchanged, 
10 
or endure after the argument is forgotten. 
By treating assent and inference as distinct, 
Newman divorces himself from the position that Locke takes: 
that our assent to a proposition should never exceed the 
strength of the arguments we have in its favor (and the 
correlative view that assents may vary in degree), and 
Newman does so in order to defend the religious assents of 
most men. His method has been called "phenomenological'' 
in contrast to Locke's, who 
consults his own ideal of how the mind ought to act 
instead of interrogating human nature, as an existing 
thing, as it is found in the world. Instead of 
going by the testimony of psychological facts ... he 
would form men as he thinks they ought to be formed, 
into something better and higher. 1 1 
Since our legitimate assents do in fact exceed the strength 
of our arguments, Newman concludes that Locke's position 
must be incorrect. Many of the convictions Locke would 
call irrational or enthusiastic Newman claims are 
natural and legitimate. 
But in allowing for the independence of assent 
from inference, Newman seems to simultaneously commit 
himself to the view that a proposition which is inferred 
must always be held conditionally, and cannot be assented 
to until it somehow breaks free from argument. For 
Newman, to infer is always to hold a proposition 
conditionally. Even the conclusion of a demonstration, 
that is a sound argument whose premises are held 
unconditionally, is, insofar as it is inferred, held 
conditionally. That Newman does mean to take this 
unusual position is evident in the following quote: 
If assent is the acceptance of truth, and truth is 
the proper object of the intellect, and no one can 
hold conditionally what by the same act he holds 
to be true, here too is a reason for saying that 
assent is an adhesion without reserve or doubt to 
the proposition to which it is given. And again, 
it is to be presumed that the word has not two 
meanings: what it has at one time it has at 
another. Inference is always inference; even if 
demonstrative, it is still conditional; it 
establishes an incontrovertible conclusion on the 
condition of incontrovertible premisses,12 
Now in most discussions of inference Newman 
excludes demonstration, "because in concrete matter, on 
which I am engaged, demonstration is impossible." He 
does not define "concrete matter," but clearly means 
9 
to include in the Grammar questions surrounding the 
13 
existence of God. 
B. APPREHENSION 
The model for Newman's analysis of apprehension 
is the categorical proposition, a proposition of the 
kind "Some women are logical," where "women" is the 
subject term, and "logical" the predicate term. He does 
not address the difficulties presented by other kinds 
of statements in the Grammar. Newman maintains that 
assent, to a greater degree than inference, requires 
apprehension of the terms of its proposition, especially 
the predicate term, because the predicate term works 
to elucidate the subject. An inference, by way of 
14 
contrast, can operate on symbols of unknown meaning. 
Assent 
is the absolute acceptance of a proposition 
without any condition, .. it presupposes 
the condition, not only of some previous 
inference in favour of the proposition, but 
especially of some concommitant apprehension 
of its terms,15 
When he emphasizes the part that apprehension 
of the predicate term plays in our assent to a 
proposition, Newman gives as examples propositions 
which are definitions of unknown terms: 
"Trade ls the interchange of goods," 
and 
"Lucern is food for cattle,1116 
10 
It is clear that many propositions, even if they fit 
the "subject is predicate" form, differ from these 
examples, and Newman's selectivity here is discussed 
in the critical remarks which follow. Apprehension 
itself Newman defines simply as "our imposition of a 
sense on the terms of which propositions are composed, 1117 
And to impose a sense is to make a term stand for a 
notion, or for a thing. 
C. THE NOTIONAL/REAL DISTINCTION 
Whether, in our apprehension of a proposition, 
its terms stand for notions, or for things, determines 
whether our apprehension is notional or real. These 
are the alternatives: 
Sometimes they [terms] stand for certain ideas 
existing inside our own minds, and for nothing 
outside of them; sometimes for things simply 
external to us, brought home to us by the 
experiences we have of them. 
Now there are propositions, in which one or 
both of the terms are common nouns, as standing 
for what is abstract, general, and non-existing, 
... these I shall call notional propositions, 
and the apprehension with which we infer or assent 
to them, notional .. 
And there are propositions, which are composed 
of singular nouns, and of which the terms stand 
for things external to us, unit and individual, 
.. and these I shall call real propositions, 
and their apprehension rea1.l8 
So at its simplest, the distinction between 
notional and real apprehension, and therefore assent, 
seems to be this: we have in notional apprehension 
a relationship between terms which are common nouns 
11 
and _ notions which exist only in our minds, and in real 
apprehension a relationship between terms which are 
singular nouns and things which exist externally to us. 
Notional assent to a proposition is correlative with 
notional apprehension of the proposition's terms, and 
real assent to a proposition requires real apprehension 
of the proposition's terms. And we have two parallel 
hierarchical arrangements, from the notion or thing, to 
the notional assent, or real assent 
notion: 
(spring-flowering bulbs) 
general term 
notional apprehension 
notional proposition: 
( "The first things up are 
spring-flowering bulbs. 11) 
notional assent 
or inference 
thing: 
(the lilac near the fence) 
singular term 
real apprehension 
real proposition: 
("The one that didn't bloom 
last year is the lilac near 
the fence. 11 ) 
real assent 
This diagram, which the passage quoted above 
seems to justify, suggests first, that the distinction 
between notions and things is to . be drawn along the 
same lines as the distinction between general and 
singular terms. And second, that notion~ and things, 
which are what terms stand for, are easily distinguished. 
Note that it would not be meaningful to talk about 
notional and real assent to the same proposition, as 
we are in the question of assent to the proposition 
"God exists" if assent were - simply a function of the 
proposition. So it must be possible to refer that 
12 
distinction back to something other than the proposition 
itself. 
D. CRITICAL REMARKS 
A preliminary difficulty referred to above is 
that when Newman assigns such importance to our 
apprehension of the predicate term in determining how 
we assent to a proposition, he has in mind propositions 
which are definitions, where the predicate does 
elucidate the subject. But many of our assents are 
not to definitions of unknown terms. Among the 
propositions we assent to are statements that a .certain 
thing exists. In the proposition "My mother exists'' 
we do not find a predicate elucidating its subject. 
(Many logicians would deny that the ~roposition has a 
logical predicate at all.) So a proposition that Newman 
means to include as a possible object of real assent, 
falls outside of the class suggested by his explanation 
of assen t itself. 
A second complication is the relation between 
notional and real apprehension, and general and 
singular terms. The notional/real distinction appears, 
in the simple diagr~m and in the quoted passage on which 
it is based, to be tied directly to the distinction 
within the spoken or written proposition between general 
and singular terms, general terms being involved in 
notional apprehension and assent, and singular terms in 
13 
rea1. The example which follows though allows real 
assent to propositions containing general nouns, and 
notional assent to propositions containing singular 
nouns. Newman uses the example of a child who tastes 
sugar for the first time. He understands his nurse's 
notional proposition "Sugar is sweet" to mean "This 
sugar is this sweet thing." Both "sugar' .' and "sweet" 
stand for things to him, or "image 's" in the 
peculiar sense that Newman uses the word, and he has a 
. 19 
real apprehension of both terms. 
Incidentally, Newman does not suggest that the 
child misunderstands the proposition "Sugar is sweet." 
Apprehension is properly our own imposition of a sense 
on a term. The priority of an individual's subjective 
understanding of a term's meaning, over any more 
objective or shared understanding of its meaning, and 
the priority of a subjective impression left by an 
external object, over the object itself, is 
characteristic of what Edward Sillem has called 
Newman's "personalism" which makes him both attractive, 
20 
and suspect. 
If we allow Newman's suggestion, and draw the 
notional/real distinction along the same lines as that 
between general and singular nouns, then again 
propositions which Newman maintains can be really 
assented to, fall outside of the class defined by his 
explanation. 
14 
The third and most important difficulty is 
this. The quality of our apprehension of a term 
cannot depend on whether or not the term is general or 
singular, but does depend on whether the term stands 
for a notion, or a thing, to the apprehender. That 
ability to discriminate what a term stands for, which 
Newman does not question, appears to presuppose this 
general epistemological position: we have direct 
sensory experience of things, in contrast to notions, 
which are produced by abstraction from our sensory 
experience, and there is an immediacy ab out our 
experience of things which makes them clearly 
recognizable as things. But there is evidence that 
this is not Newman's basic epistemological position, 
and it is certainly not the modern consensus. When 
he expressly addresses epistemological questions in 
his Notebook Newman writes 
I am conscious that I see what I call a tree or 
a house; and that consciousness is infallible. 
I am not conscious of the objective reality, but 
of the subjective sensation or impression. 
and again 
My point is, not to deny that our knowledge 
comes from experience, not to advocate innate 
forms, but to say that our experience is not 
so much of external things, but of our own 
minds. 21 
The passages in the Notebook date from 1859-1860, as 
compared to the Grammar which was written between 1866 
and 1870, and the Notebook is admittedly exploratory. 
15 
Newman does not ask the same questions in the Grammar 
(i.e. What are the objects of consciousness?) that he 
asks in his Notebook, but he does mention the 
"objectum internum" or "subject-object'' that is present 
22 
in real assent. The inconsistency of these passages 
with the passage quoted above (p. 11) is obvious. It 
is the same inconsistency that is reflected when Newman 
says alternately that in real apprehension a term stands 
23 . 24 for a thing, or for an image. Of course he means 
to connect the image to the thing, but he seems to have 
severed that connection. 
Newman had in his youth gone as far as to 
doubt the reality of external objects. He writes in 
the Apologia that the Calvinist view he held at age 
fifteen, of being predestined for eternal glory, 
tended to confirm in him the idea of "two and two only 
absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself 
and my Creator," and the reality of other beings paled 
25 
in comparison. The significance of Newman's earlier 
questioning of the reality of external objects, and later 
affirmation that we know what is internal better than 
what is external to our minds is this. First, the 
distinction between notional and real apprehension is 
difficult to draw while remaining within Newman's 
epistemology, and second, Newman was sufficiently 
skeptical not to base an argument f9r God's existence 
on any knowledge of external objects. 
16 
The introduction of a "subjective impression" 
into real apprehension works to blur the distinction 
between notional and real apprehension in this way: 
if our consciousness of things is actually 
consciousness of a subjective impression, then real 
apprehension is a relationship between a term and that 
subjective impression, and the existence of the 
26 
objective reality is a presumption. Notional 
apprehension has been explained as a relationship 
between a term and a notion, and there is (I think) a 
parallel presumption that nothing external corresponds 
to what is appropriately apprehended as a notion. But 
then real apprehension is more like notional 
apprehension than it originally seemed to be. Terms 
do not stand for notions, or things, but for different 
kinds of mental objects, and objective reality seems 
to be beyond us. Remembering that to apprehend a term 
in a real way is to make it stand for a thing, the 
thing it must stand for is a subjective impression, 
when the object is before us; or an image, when the 
object is remembered or created by imagination out of 
past impressions. Modern psychologists might use 
"percept" in the first case, "memory image" in the 
27 
second, and "created image" in the third. Newman 
seems to use "image" for all three. The important 
point, and the last of these critical points, is that 
17 
the distinction between these two kinds of mental 
objects, notions and images, is less clear than either 
the distinction between notions and things, or between 
general and singular terms, as the discussion on images 
below will show. 
What an image is, is the subject of the final 
part of this section, and what an image of God could 
be is the subject of the second and third sections. 
Real assent is also imaginative assent, and the 
presence of an image is evidently its defining 
characteristic. We have excluded two possible 
explanations of the difference between notional and 
real assent above: 1) that the terms of a proposition, 
either general or singular, will tell us the kind of 
assent it may involve (whether it is understood as 
general or singular helps to tell us); and 2) that the 
difference can be explained wholly in terms of what is 
apprehended--notion, or thing. For "thing'', "subjective 
impression" or "image" must be substituted, and the 
distinction between notion and image is a difficult one. 
E. IMAGES 
Newman emphasizes the role of images in real 
assent in this passage from the Grammar 
18 
In its notional assents as well as in its 
inferences, the mind contemplates its own 
creations instead of things; in real, it is 
directed towards things, represented by the 
impressions which they have left on the 
imagination. These images, when assented-
to, have an influence both on the individual 
and on society, which mere notions - cannot 
exert.28 
He extends the meaning of the term "image" 
in several important directions. First, as has been 
mentioned, he uses it by implication for the percept 
associated with a present object of perception, or 
for what he called in his Notebook a subjective 
impressi9n. Second, he uses "image" for the impress 
of senses other than sight (say the memory of a smell), 
although "image" in ordinary language is more likely 
to mean something visuai. 29 Third, he uses "image" 
/' 
even for past mental acts: "hope, inquiry, effort, 
triumph, disappointment, suspicion, hatred. 1130 And 
last, Newman speaks of "images" of facts. 31 So beside 
. there being images associated with the real apprehension 
of terms, there are also images associated with the 
real proposition which is assented to. The images of 
God involved in real assent to his . existence certainly 
go far beyond mental pictures. 
It is difficult to find any properties these 
images share, and I think there is only one which is 
critical, that is their "impressiveness''· There may 
be a clue to what Newman means by "image" or 
"imaginative assent" in cases where there can be no 
19 
question of an object or sight (like "God exists"), 
in the meaning of "image" when something is actually 
seen. 
When an object is perceived, the eye's 
lens focuses an image on the retina. That image 
is an impress left by the experience of seeing. The 
image is there during perception; it can be recalled 
at a later time, and it can be combined with .other 
images to create composite images of never-experienced 
things. And I think it is traces or impresses of 
experiences, that need not be in any sense visual 
images, that Newman thinks are required for real 
assent. A dictionary definition of "impress" is 
A mark, character, figure, or image produced 
by or as by pressure; as, the impress of a 
seal in wax, 
and of "impressive" 
Relating to that which has an internal effect 
or carries a meaning for the subject himself.3 2 
Take an example of Newman's that fits the broader 
sense of "image". 
Able men ... who are exercised in physical 
investigations ... cannot bring themselves to 
entertain as a hypothesis ... a thought contrary 
to that vivid impression of which they are the 
victims, that the uniformity of nature, which 
they witness hour by hour, is equivalent to a 
necessary, inviolable law.JJ 
In short, I think that although Newman does not use 
"image" literally, he does use it meaningfully; the 
term suggests qualities that real assent needs. 
20 
In a real assent to a proposition concerning 
God's existence, we can expect to find some inference 
which leads to our asserting the proposition, and 
real apprehension of the proposition's terms, 
especially its predicate term . 
• 
21 
II. NEWMAN'S ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIENCE 
The images of real assent "have an influence 
both on the individual, and on society, which mere 
notions cannot exert. 1134 Now if it is true, then the 
proposition "God exists" ought to matter. So the 
ultimate importance of any formal argument for God's 
existence lies in the extent of its association with 
real assent. Assent has two prerequisites: more 
importantly, the apprehension of the predicate term 
of the proposition which is assented to, and less 
importantly, some previous inference, in the broadest 
sense, supporting the proposition.35 
The role of inference in real assent is for 
Newman clearly secondary to the role that images play, 
because he thinks sophisticated inference first, to be 
closed to most men who should believe, and second, 
even to be unsuited to real assent. He writes in the 
University Sermons on the first point "If children, if 
the poor, if the busy, can have true faith, yet cannot 
weigh evidence, evidence is not the simple foundation 
on which faith is built. 1136 And on the second, in the 
Grammar 
22 
the paradox is true, that, when Inference is 
clearest, Assent may be least forcible, and, 
when Assent is most intense, Inference may be 
least distinct; for though acts of assent 
require previous acts of inference, they require 
them, not as adequate causes, but as sine qua 
non conditions, and while the apprehension--
strengthens Assent, Inference often weakens the 
apprehension,37 
First the inference--in the passage from the 
Development of Christian Doctrine quoted in the 
introduction, Newman describes the reasons for 
believing as "presumptions and guesses, ventures after 
the truth ... rather than accurate proofs." And the 
whole second part of the Grammar is devoted to the 
informal method of inference, which proceeds by 
the illative sense.3 8 Newman holds both that most 
believers do not possess formal arguments for God's 
existence, and that they are justified in believing 
( that is,. their belief is reasonable). As a Christian 
apologist, Newman held that "deductions have no power 
of persuasion 113 9 and so he had little impetus to 
develop a formal proof, and in fact did not publish 
one. The difficulty for Newman as a Roman Catholic 
(the writing of the Development of Christian Doctrine 
precipitated his conversion in 1845) is that the Roman 
Catholic Church teaches that the existence of God can 
be demonstrated by reason. When Newman outlined his 
"Proof of Theism" in his Notebook he noted 
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As to the Being of God, I suppose that 
conscience teaches some attributes in which all 
are implicit--& afterwards deduced by the reason. 
And I should think (& hope) that this would 
satisfy the requisite of the S. Congr. [Sacred 
Congregatio~ of the Index which ... pronounced 
the Being of a God demonstrable by reason.40 
Here in outline is Newman's "proof of theism." 
He wrote it in 1859 because he had been misunderstood to 
hold that God's existence implies moral obligation. His 
thought, as shown below, was that moral obligation 
implies God's existence4 1 The passage is paraphrased. 
1) An individual is conscious of his own existence. 
2) In the fact of his existence is included his 
memory, sensation, reasoning, and conscience. 
3) "Conscience" means the discrimination of acts as 
praise-worthy or blame-worthy, and has two senses: one, 
the act of moral judgement; and two, the particular 
judgement formed. 
4) All individuals know the feeling of a good or 
bad conscience, although they may differ over what 
conscience requires of them. "Conscience" here means 
sanction or command (the first sense above). 
5) Conscience implies a relation between the soul 
and something both exterior and superior to itself. 
That something has an excellence it does not possess, 
and an authority it cannot challenge.4 2 
Newman begins with his conscioQsness of his 
own existence, and takes · the fact of his existence to 
include the fact of conscience. Newman thinks it improper 
to speak of his mental faculties (and he includes 
conscience among them) as things separable from himself, 
as things for instance in which he could "have faith."43 
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He will not dispute his existence with conscience contained 
in it, but holds it as a first principle which must be 
granted. Concerning first principles "which are called 
self-evident by their respective advocates because they 
are evident in no other way," and he thinks less of formal 
inference because it does not produce first principles, 
but only takes us easily away from, and back to, them. 
He believes that they arise from the personl characteristics 
of the knower.44 
Newman claims that one's consciousness of his 
existence and his conscience (they're an odd pair but 
Newman means to keep them together) is an "intetnal fact." 
It is internal, as opposed to, say, the external fact that 
a table is under this paper. Because it is internal, it 
overcomes the skepticism Newman sometimes leans to, and it 
is a desirable starting point for an argument for God's 
existence. 
He writes that 
what is internal to the mind is an object of 
consciousness, which external things are not. 
Thus the line is broad~ deep between the reliance 
on reason or conscience and upon the trustworthiness 
of the impressions of the senses or the reality 
(existence) of matter. Hence the being of a God, 
arising out of what is internal, is an external fact 
different in evidence (proof) from every other 
external fact.45 
Conscience itself has two aspects: one is its 
"commandingness"--Newman calls it a sanction--and the other 
is what it commands. Newman based his argument on the 
first, and not the second. To begin with the second aspect 
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of conscience could involve him in a petitio principii; 
to assume something commanded seems clearly to assume the 
existence of someone who commands, in a way that the 
authoritative aspect of conscience does not.4 6 
A curious consequence of this division of conscience 
into what it commands and the manner in which it commands 
it, is that what conscience commands, and Newman admits 
that varies widely, is irrelevant to the argument. Whether 
I become acquainted with conscience's sanction in 
connection with the commandment to "Shrink all your 
enemies' heads" or in connection with the commandment to 
"Love your enemies," it is my confrontation with its 
sanction which leads me to the existence of God.4 7 
Conscience as a sanction is responsible for the 
unique set of feelings which arise when it is transgressed, 
or obeyed: "self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, 
chill dismay at the prospect of the future--and their 
· contraries when the conscience is good, as real though 
less forcible." Newman believes simply, and it is on this 
that the proof depends, that these feelings require a person 
"to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, 
whose claims upon us we fear," and that person is God.4 8. 
Let me turn to my own criticisms of Newman's 
argument for the existence of God. First, when Newman 
begins his argument he means by "conscience" "sanction or 
command" but it seems to be the feelings that conscience 
as sanction or command engenders that are denoted by 
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"conscience" in the conclusion. In other words, there 
is an additional distinction between meanings of "conscience" 
that is not clearly made. Second, Newman writes that the 
feelings of a good or bad conscience would not arise if 
there were not a person toward whom they were directed; 
he writes that ''inanimate things cannot stir our affections, 
these are correlative with persons .• These feelings 
in us are such as require for their exciting cause an . 
intelligent being. 1149 But we know of many cases in which · 
our feelings are inappropriately directed towards inanimate 
things--If the bread box falls open and knocks the coffee 
pot off the counter I may in my anger stomp on the pot--and 
Newman has not established that the feelings of coriscience 
are not inappropriately directed in a similar way. 
And it is still a further step to identify the 
person required by the feelings of conscience of God, and 
not with someone only God-like. Psychodynamic theorists 50 
might object that we feel guilty and ashamed and afraid 
because we have internalized and subsequently transgressed 
our parent's or our society's rules for moral behavior, and 
that it is in fact toward our parents that our feelings are 
directed. And in a child who has been less effectively 
socialized, those feelings of guilt, fear and shame might 
not occur at all. The only difficulty Newman offers to 
this interpretation is that he sees in the feelings of 
conscience even the implication of a final judgement, which 
presumably our parents could not bring about. 
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Learning theorists or behaviorists51 explain 
emotion as a correlative of a personal history of 
punishment or reinforcement; if one were punished as a 
child for failing to love his enemies, the emotional 
correlative of punishment could endure beyond the 
punishment, and if he were reinforced for failing to 
love his enemies, then a very different kind of emotional 
correlative might endure into his adulthood. And it is 
not necessary that a person be the deliverer of punishment, 
or reinforcement. Newman assumes that conscience as 
sanction, and its correlative emotions, develop in a way 
that is relatively uninfluenced by social forces, or by an 
idiosyncratic history of reinforcement. 52 He cannot of 
course be faulted for failing to anticipate Freud, or 
Skinner. 
To return to Newman himself, we can look at his 
proof from the inside, or from the outside. From without, 
his existence includes his conscience which in turn implies 
God's existence. This seems to be nothing other than a 
traditional moral argument. But when we examine the proof 
from within, it is our "consciousness" of our own existence, 
our "feelings" of conscience's commands transgressed or 
obeyed, and the "image" of God we form which assume 
importance over (metaphysical) facts and logic. It is the 
image, apart from the reasoning, which characterizes real 
assent. 
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Newman describes in the Grammar the God an 
especially good child might imagine: 
First, it involves the impression on his mind 
of an unseen Being with whom he is in immediate 
relation, ... Next, of One whose goodwill 
towards him he is assured of, and can take for 
granted-- ... Further, of One who can hear 
him, wherever he happens to be, and who can 
read his thoughts, ... Lastly, of One who 
can effect a critical change in the state of 
feeling of others towards him.53 
Now this would seem to be an image of God with the 
ordinary attributes-- He is invisible, personal, 
benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent, but the child 
is aware of them as attributes of a person who is 
active in his life. Again, "image" seems to relate 
more to the impressiveness which describes our contact 
with things (presumably) external to us, than it does 
to a visual or analogous representation. This image is 
clearly not the product of direct sensory experience of 
God, but of the emotions aroused by obeying or disobeying 
· the commands of conscience (remember those emotions are 
relative to conscience's sanction, and not to the content 
of its commands). It is not possible to exclude entirely 
the aspect of representation from Newman's use of "image." 
If we do so we cannot distinguish notional from real 
apprehension, and the distinction is certainly more obscure 
in the case of the apprehension of God's attributes, than 
it is in the apprehension of "sugar" and "sweet." It is not 
particularly helpful to have recourse to real apprehension's 
"impressiveness" alone. 
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The image in real assent is also defined by 
Newman as personal, and indirectly practical. The 
belief in God 
may be a real and personal belief, being 
produced in different individual minds by 
various experiences and disposing causes, 
variously combined; such as warm or strong 
imagination, great sensibility, compunction 
and horror at sin . . parental example and 
instruction, religious friends, strange 
providences, powerful preaching. In each case 
the image in the mind, with the experiences out 
of which it is formed, would be a personal 
result ... ,54 
In contrast, the notional apprehension of a term, and 
notional assent to the proposition in which it occurs, 
implies that each person who apprehends it (notionally) 
has imposed the same sense on it, and the notion which 
the term stands for is a common product of abstraction. 
The image is indirectly practical because on 
Newman's view of it, images arouse emotions, and 
emotions (not pure intellect) lead to action. If 
there is something that we ought to do in consequence 
of our assent (and God's existence is a proposition 
with consequences for action) then the assent will need 
to affect our emotions, and our emotions are affected by 
. t t' 55 images, no no ions. 
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III. THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTINGENT EXISTENCE 
The preceeding section discussed what Newman 
considered to be the best formal argument for God's 
existence, and the characteristics of the real assent 
which might accompany it. I have made the assumption 
that the formal argument in the Notebook could persuade 
at least a philosopher as effectively as the informal 
argument from conscience in Grammar. If he were persuaded, 
then he would give his real assent. It is still worth 
noting that for Newman the role of inference in real 
assent is minor, and assent is a substantive something 
else, involving more importantly the imaginative 
apprehension of a proposition's terms. I am attempting 
to show in this section that one of Aquinas' arguments in 
support of God's existence--his Third Way--can be stated 
to accomplish the same ends. If successful, it shows that 
Newman's suspicions of the traditional arguments in support 
of God's existence are unfounded. The interpretation of 
Aquinas draws upon ideas developed by existential Thomism. 
Newman comes closest to the cosmological arguments 
of Aquinas when he discusses the "Evidences," or arguments, 
like William Paley's, from design or order. He says in 
the Grammar 
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If I am asked to use Paley's argument for my 
conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be 
converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked 
to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not 
care to overcome their reason without touching 
their hearts,56 
Newman does not treat the metaphysical arguments as if 
there were an image of God to be gained by them. 
Aquinas writes in the Summa theologiae that there 
are five ways to the existence of God; what follows in 
outline is his Third Way. Modern Thomists favor it, 
although Aquinas did not,57 
We find in nature things that are possible to be 
and not to be, ... it is impossible for these always 
to exist, for that which is possible not to be .at some 
time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not 
to be, then at one time there could have been nothing 
in existence, because that which does not exist only 
begins to exist by something already existing. 
Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, 
it would have been impossible for anything to have 
begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be 
in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all 
beings are merely possible, but there must exist 
som .ething the existence of which is necessary. But 
every necessary thing either has its necessity caused 
by another, or not. Now i~ is impossible to go on to 
infinity in necessary things which have their necessity 
caused by another, . . Therefore we cannot but 
postulate the existence of some being having of itself 
its own necessity,58 
Aquinas believes the proposition asserting God's 
existence to be self-evident in itself, although not to us. 
The function of demonstration must be to make explicit 
information which is already contained in the premises, since 
the conclusion of a deductive argument cannot go beyond its 
premises. Therefore one of the strongest criticisms of the 
cosmological argument (and it applies to Newman's argument 
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from conscience too) bears on the nature of argument 
itself. That criticism is that the argument has assumed 
what it seeks to prove, that the premise on which it depends 
is something like "If there are any beings which come into 
being and pass away, there is an absolutely necessary 
being," and if we admit that,we have admitted the existence 
of God. 59 
But the argument in fact begins with an existential 
proposition--"We find things in nature that are possible 
to be and not to be," and we know that many people who 
admit that do not admit God's existence (although there are 
relatively fewer who admit conscience but not God's 
existence). We are concerned with the argument in relation 
to real assent, which Newman says is an assent to an image 
that arises out of our personal experience, and that image 
creates feelings in us which lead us to act. 
Aquinas begins with the observation that there are 
some things whose existence is contingent--things which 
could be, or could not be. The observation may not be as 
"internal" as Newman's beginning with his own existence, 
but Aquinas has less need to avoid talking about external 
things, because his epistemology is more realistic. 60 
The flow of the argument is from contingent existence to 
necessary existence, and if we apprehend "contingent 
existence" in a real way, then we are, just as much as if 
we experience our conscience, on the path towards real 
assent to God's existence. 
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What does it mean to really apprehend existence? 
The real apprehension of existence has been frequently 
described by Jacques Maritain, a Thomist, in his 
philosophical works, and it is this emphasis which makes 
the term "existentialist" appropriate to his (and he would 
say also to Aquinas') metaphysics. Maritain does not use 
Newman's vocabulary, but speaks instead of the "intuition 
of being as such" or the "primordial intuition of 
existence~ 61 The characteristics which lead Maritain to 
call it "intuitive" are the same that Newman finds in 
imaginative or real apprehension. 
It is not necessary to be a philosopher of religion 
in order to experience the intuition of being as such; 
Jean-Paul Sartre describes in detail the real apprehension 
(to use Newman's term) of the existence of objects in 
Nausea. 
All these objects ... how can I explain? They 
inconvenienced me; I would have liked them to exist 
less strongly, more dryly, in a more abstract way, 
with more reservei The chestnut tree pressed itself 
against my eyes. Green rust covered it half-way up; 
the back, black and swollen, looked like boiled 
leather, The sound of water in the Masqueret fountain 
sounded in my ears, made a nest there, filled them 
with signs' my nostrils overflowed with a green putrid 
odour.62 
Now it is not primarily the qualities of objects which Sartre 
apprehends--their colors or sounds or smells. Sartre 
explains that "The sea is green" no longer means to him 
"sea" and "green" while "is" means nothing, nor does it 
mean that sea belongs to the class of green objects. 
Instead "is" has acquired a meaning: existence has unveiled 
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its~lf, has penetrated his eyes, nose, mouth; existence 
nauseates him. It is clear that to Sartre "existence" 
does not stand for a notion, but the thought he has of it 
"is as of something individual and from without," and it 
is precisely that characteristic of it which makes it 
appropriate to speak of an image of existence, and to call 
its apprehension real. Wrapped up in the apprehension of 
the existence of objects is an apprehension of their 
contingency, and of ones own contingent existence. 63 And 
for Sartre the real apprehension of contingent existence 
leads nowhere. 
Maritain confirms Sartre's experience: 
the primordial intuition of being is the intuition 
of the solidity and inexorability of existence; 
and, second, of the death and nothingness to which 
ones own existence is liable. 
But Maritain discovers in the same intuition 
that this solid and inexorable existence, perceived 
in anything whatsoever, implies--I do not know in 
what form, perhaps in the things themselves, perhaps 
separately from them--some absolute irrefragable 
existence, completely free from nothingness and death. 64 
This intuition of being as such is the starting point of an 
informal argument for God's existence which is very much like 
Newman's own from conscience. Where Newman takes his own 
existence with conscience included with it, Maritain takes 
the existence of things and his own existence (thrown into 
relief by the existence of other things) with contingency 
contained in it. In the feelings of conscience when it is 
transgressed or followed, Newman sees that God's existence 
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is required. And in his (often emotional) awareness of 
contingent existence, Maritain sees that some existence 
must be necessary. "God exists" is in both cases a real 
proposition, to which the believer may give his real 
assent. 
The image involved in Maritain's real assent is 
also personal, not shared, because it must come from ones 
own experience. Maritain quotes another's autobiographical 
account of the intuition of being: "suddenly there came to 
me from heaven like a lightning flash the thought: I am 
a self," and he holds that the personal experience is a 
prerequisite for metaphysics. 6 5 The drawing out of this 
intuition of existence into a formal proof produce s Aquinas' 
Third Way, and Newman's "Proof of Theism" is related to the 
child's feelings of conscience in much the same way. 
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CONCLUSION 
It seems that a traditional cosmological argument 
serves Newman's purposes well. Aquinas' Third Way directs 
us toward the contingent existence of things and the 
existentialists have described what it is to apprehend 
existence in a real way. The real apprehension of 
contingent existence leads to the real apprehension of 
necessary existence, and there need not be anytping merely 
notional about formal argument for God's existence, and to 
assent to the proposition which asserts that God exists. 
Newman's own argument may be flawed in its starting 
point; it is unclear that a socially unconditioned 
conscience, which Newman's argument requires is included 
in the fact of an individual's existence, and many 
contemporary thinkers will have trouble with it. It is 
even more unclear that it especially implies the existence 
of God .. The argument allow~ for the possibility that the 
feelings of conscience disobeyed or transgressed are simply 
inappropriate; and it is their appropriateness, and not 
their simple existence, that suggests God's existence. 
Newman's argument is not a clearer nor a surer path toward 
imaginative apprehension and assent. 
The distinction itself between notional and real 
assent is not explained by Newman's examples. The 
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difference cannot correspond to the distinction in the 
spoken or written proposition between general and singular 
nouns, because that distinction cuts across the 
distinction between notional and real assent. And if 
the distinction comes down to the apprehension of notions 
as notions, or things as things, then a more realistic 
epistemology than Newman supplies is needed. What remains 
important in Newman's explanation is the role of images 
in real apprehension and assent. 
"Image" though is understood in a sense so much 
broader than "mental picture" that its secondary 
characteristics are more informative on the nature of 
real assent. First, it is a unique personal product, and 
second, it has consequences for action. It may be that 
the distinction ought to be drawn in the affective and 
volitional domains also, rather than restricted to the 
cognitive. To do so would be to claim that the 
distinction between notional and real assent to "God exists" 
requires, in addition to information about what the terms 
stand for, information about how one feels, or what he 
does, in consequence of his assent. In his phenomenological 
accounts of particular real assents, Newman does describe 
feelings, and the implications they might have for action. 
But Newman has restricted the grounds of the distinction 
between notional and real to the cognitive domain. 66 
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